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Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria 
Its Operation Plan, Objectives, and Consequences for the West’s Policies 
Markus Kaim and Oliver Tamminga 
The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September 
2015, discussion has been rife in the media and in political circles as to what intentions 
Russia might be pursuing with its intervention in Syria. However, if one takes into ac-
count the force package deployed to Syria, the manner in which the Russian air forces 
have proceeded, and the Kremlin’s official statements after the Assad visit to Moscow, the 
main features of an operation plan quickly emerge. It has repercussions far beyond Syria. 
 
On 30 September 2015, the Russian mili-
tary embarked on a series of operations 
in Syria that had been prepared from the 
beginning of September onwards with the 
establishment of a base south of Latakia 
and the deployment of the relevant forces. 
However, the military and political aims 
of the Russian government, as well as the 
motives behind the military intervention, 
are still unclear. 
The Russian government has never 
hidden its willingness to act against all 
forces fighting the Damascus regime. In 
fact, Moscow and Damascus view all mili-
tarily active opposition groups as terrorists 
that must be combated. And yet Russia has 
always avoided joining the US-led coalition 
of 60 states and international organisations 
that was formed to counter IS. Instead, the 
Russian government began early on to forge 
an alliance with Syria, Iran, Iraq and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, even though these 
actors are pursuing different interests. 
Russia’s military capacity in Syria 
In the past few weeks, Russia has been 
increasing its deployment of military forces 
to the air base near Latakia, in the north-
west of Syria. 
The marines, T-90 tanks, combat vehicles 
and artillery deployed there mainly serve 
to protect the air base from attacks by IS 
or other opposition groups. The number of 
marines, between 300 and 500, is sufficient 
to provide lasting force protection and com-
bat service support for a base of this kind, 
but too small to be used offensively. 
The Su-24 and Su-34 fighter bombers, 
Su-25 ground attack aircraft, Mi-24 attack 
helicopters and reconnaissance drones 
that Russia has deployed to Syria are pri-
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marily useful in contributing to land opera-
tions. 
Their main application would seem to 
be guaranteeing the operational freedom of 
action and freedom of manoeuvre of Syrian 
or other troops on the ground, supporting 
counter-offensives and destroying, disrupt-
ing and degrading the enemy’s ground 
forces, even the enemy’s depth position 
in the area of operations. With their arma-
ments and ability to fly relatively slowly, 
the Su-25 ground attack aircraft in particu-
lar specialise in providing close air support 
for ground troops. The fighter bombers 
can stay in the theatre of operations for a 
comparatively long time because of their 
deployable radius, waiting to be assigned 
potential targets. The Russian government 
has confirmed that the ground offensive 
by Syrian troops is being carried out under 
Russian air operations cover. This corrobo-
rates the intent behind the military capa-
bilities that have been transferred to Syria. 
However, Moscow has also relocated 
weapons systems into Syria that have 
nothing to do with the fight against IS or 
rebel forces, but are instead expressly 
intended for protecting the Syrian regime. 
The ostensible purpose of these radars, anti-
aircraft missile systems and Su-30 multi-
role fighter aircraft, as well as the means 
for electronic warfare, is to prevent or limit 
enemy aerial warfare, protect one’s forces 
from enemy air attacks and ensure the 
integrity of one’s air space. However, since 
neither IS nor any other opposition group 
has airplanes or the means of carrying out 
air strikes, these systems must have quite 
a different rationale: the very presence of 
these weapons systems acts as a “protective 
shield” over the Russian and Syrian forces 
in a specific area of western and north-
western Syria, because it represents a seri-
ous danger to western combat aircraft. This 
form of air superiority has an immediate 
impact on the use of US and allied means 
for aerial warfare, and forces them to co-
ordinate and de-conflict their own opera-
tions with Russia so as to avoid incidents 
and even accidents. Examples of the new 
risks that can now be incurred are the 
incidents where a Russian fighter plane 
“strayed” into Turkish airspace; US fighter 
planes aborted their attacks after getting 
too close to Russian jets; and an allegedly 
Russian drone that was brought down in 
Turkish airspace. 
Russia thus has a de-facto veto over air 
operations in Russian-controlled Syrian air-
space. Put differently, through its military 
actions, Russia has gained direct leverage 
over the aircraft movements of the inter-
national anti-IS coalition and is effectively 
limiting the coalition’s operational freedom. 
The objectives behind 
Russia’s actions 
Viewed collectively, these elements give a 
preliminary picture of the situation, and 
the contours of an operation plan emerge. 
Russia intends to pursue several different 
goals with its military intervention. 
On the operational level, Moscow is cur-
rently pursuing the goal of protecting the 
Assad regime from opposition members of 
all stripes, and not just from IS. A glance 
at the regions of Syria where Russian air 
attacks have so far taken place makes clear 
that the purpose is to crush opposition 
groups in the north of the country and on 
the periphery of areas controlled by Assad’s 
troops, as well as rebel enclaves. So far, at 
least, the fight against IS appears to be of 
secondary importance, as an ingredient in 
the process of political legitimisation for 
Russia’s engagement. That, at any rate, is 
the direction in which Russia’s choice of 
targets for its air operations has been 
pointing from the start. 
In an interview, President Putin declared 
that the goal of the intervention was to 
stabilise what he deemed to be the legally 
recognised government in Damascus, and 
create the preconditions for a political com-
promise in Syria. Until further notice, the 
strategic goal is therefore to preserve an 
Alawite “core Syria”. This has been achieved 
inter alia by the creation of an undeclared, 
de-facto no-fly zone for the western anti-IS 
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coalition over parts of Syria, whose effect 
was barely lessened by the Russian-Ameri-
can Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria of 
20 October. 
The transfer of parts of the Russian 
Black Sea fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, 
which Moscow is considering, also serves 
this goal and could be interpreted as con-
tributing to an “anti-access/area denial” 
strategy, whereby other military forces are 
prevented from invading an area of opera-
tions or else have their operational freedom 
in a certain territory curtailed. 
On the political level, following the 
Ukraine crisis, Russia appears to link its 
military intervention with efforts to make 
the international community see it as a 
central actor in containing or even solving 
the Syria conflict. At the same time, Mos-
cow is anxious to demonstrate, by building 
a counter-alliance with Syria, Iran and Iraq, 
that this alliance is more effective than the 
US-led coalition and that, moreover, it has 
greater potential legitimacy since it is based 
on initiatives by the respective governments 
and includes local partners. The advantage 
of the Russian position became evident on 
9 October, when the US government an-
nounced that it would discontinue its pro-
gramme to train and equip Syrian rebels, 
which had only started in December 2014. 
In September, Washington had been forced 
to admit that it had trained fewer than 50 
fighters to date, and announced that it 
would concentrate instead on providing 
support for existing groups already fighting 
IS in Syria. Thus, while Moscow has a mili-
tary partner “on the ground” in Syria, the 
international coalition – some parts of 
which are committed to fighting IS, others 
the Assad regime – has to forego such back-
ing almost entirely. 
Repercussions for Israel 
The Russian military presence also has 
repercussions for Israel. Although Prime 
Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that 
Israel will not accept any restrictions on its 
military’s freedom of action, Jerusalem too 
will have to coordinate and de-conflict its 
movements in Syrian airspace with Mos-
cow. That will make it more difficult in the 
future for Israel to carry out air attacks, as 
it has occasionally done in the past with 
the aim of preventing Iranian arms deliv-
eries reaching Hezbollah via Syria. On the 
other hand, Israel now has a powerful con-
tact, should the future course of the war 
in Syria ever fundamentally affect Israeli 
security interests.  
Conclusion 
Russia’s engagement in Syria has taken the 
West by surprise, and substantially changed 
the framework for the fight against IS and 
for containing the Syrian civil war. To what 
extent this is also a setback for the fight 
against IS in Syria (and in Iraq) depends on 
the willingness of Russia and the US to co-
operate with one another in the coming 
months. 
Politically speaking, a series of assump-
tions underpinning the West’s Syria policy 
have been made void by Russia’s military 
intervention, or need to be nuanced or 
revised: 
1.  The premise of many western govern-
ments that President Assad cannot play any 
part in Syria’s future political order is no 
longer sustainable. Despite the countless 
human rights violations and war crimes, 
and despite his responsibility for the exodus 
and expulsion of millions of Syrians, Assad 
will have to be accepted as a provisional 
interlocutor by all those governments and 
internal opposition forces who count on 
the Syrian civil war being containable with 
Moscow’s help. Initial statements of west-
ern government representatives already 
point in that direction. The most recent ter-
ritorial gains by IS may impose a sequence 
on the international crisis management: 
first, the international community might 
have to devote its attention to the fight 
against IS; and only thereafter could it 
address the other dimensions of the Syrian 
civil war. It remains to be seen what pros-
pect of success the parallel UN efforts have 
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in bringing the domestic Syrian parties to 
the conflict to the negotiating table, so as 
to discuss the conditions for a ceasefire and 
prepare the political transition. In the short 
term, Russia’s military intervention will 
make it more difficult to find a political 
solution to the conflict. 
2.  In this context, the second assump-
tion – that the format and momentum of 
the international Iran negotiations can 
be seamlessly used by the West in the Syria 
conflict – is also questionable. Russia has 
offered its cooperation in the fight against 
IS in Syria, but it comes at a price: President 
Assad must remain in office for the time 
being. For Moscow, this appears to be less 
about the President’s person than about 
positioning itself against regime change 
brought about by the West. Anyone who 
considers Russia a partner on this issue 
will find it hard to avoid re-prioritising 
accordingly (see item 1). 
3.  Depending on what other end-states 
of the war Russia might pursue, a third 
assumption may also become void. Given 
that Russia’s military capabilities are effec-
tive but manageable in size (so far), there is 
some doubt that Russia wants – or is able – 
to support the Syrian government in assert-
ing its monopoly on violence over the whole 
country. This would, after all, require a 
broad offensive deploying Russian ground 
troops. And most likely, it would only result 
in a consolidation of the already existing 
borders of the various territories. Against 
this background, it is at the very least 
debatable whether the West’s Syria policy 
should continue to be orientated towards 
maintaining the country’s territorial unity. 
Admittedly, the Russian leadership is 
hardly in a position to contain the Syrian 
civil war on its own and also defeat IS. Nor 
does that seem to be Russia’s goal: continu-
ing instability in Syria and a comparable 
situation in Iraq would enable Moscow not 
only to present itself as the alternative to 
the West, but more importantly as a kind of 
veto power in the future configuration of 
the Near and Middle East. 
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